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 T
imely and widespread dissemination 
of resources and information related 
to pathogenic threats plays a critical 
role in outbreak recognition, research , 
containment, and mitigation (1, 2) , as 
stakeholders from government, public 
health (PH), industry, and academia seek to 
implement interventions and develop vac-
cines, diagnostics, and drugs (3). But there 
are persistent barriers to sharing and coop-
erative research and development (R&D) in 
the context of epidemics, rooted in a lack 
of trust in confidentiality and reciprocity 
(4, 5), ambiguity over resource ownership 
(6), and conflicting public, private, and aca-
demic incentives (2–4, 6). Here, we suggest 
how recent advances in blockchain and 
related technologies can enable decentral-
ized mechanisms to help break down these 
systemic and largely nontechnological bar-
riers. These mechanisms resolve scalability, 
energy consumption, and security concerns 
of early blockchain models and may be ap-
plied to underpin and interconnect, rather 
than supersede or conflict with existing, well-
established systems and practices for storing, 
sharing, and governing resources. 
As opposed to centralized databases that 
are maintained by a single party, a blockchain 
involves an infrastructure of different parties 
(nodes), each maintaining an identical copy 
of a distributed ledger. Once time-stamped 
into the ledger, records cannot be altered or 
removed unnoticed, owing to cryptographic 
data-structuring. A one-way algorithm pro-
cesses data into cryptographic identifiers 
(hash codes), which are unique for an input 
value, that is, the algorithm will have a differ-
ent output if the input is altered in any way. 
There is no way to reconstruct underlying 
data content from a hash code. In a block-
chain, the hash code of the preceding record 
is included in the new record before “hash-
ing” and time-stamping it, making the ledger 
evolve as a chained, time-stamped record-
keeping system that is tamper-resistant by 
design: The hash of an altered ledger will 
deviate from the hash of the consensually 
verified ledger as maintained by the rest of 
the nodes. Hence, blockchains enable proof 
of the existence of specific data objects and 
their content at specific points in time while 
data itself may remain concealed. This dis-
tributed infrastructure offers a common 
and inviolable source of records that can be 
verified by (permitted) network entities, re-
moving the necessity of having a mutually 
trusted, centralized intermediary for verifica-
tion and record-keeping of exchanges.
BARRIERS TO SHARING
Outbreak R&D depends on access to patho-
gen samples, data, and information, which 
are shared through physical collections of 
microbial and viral cultures (biobanks), 
open-access or restricted genetic sequence 
databases, or ad hoc peer-to-peer exchanges, 
and often only after having been shared 
through scientific publishing or patenting. 
The following barriers hamper timely and 
widespread sharing through these systems. 
Procedural delays
Rapid international cooperation during out-
breaks is challenged by a lack of trust in reci-
procity, with countries fearing unfair sharing 
of benefits arising from the use of their local 
resources by foreign parties. A prominent 
example arose in 2006, when the Indonesian 
government denied foreign access to H5N1 
influenza samples because of concerns about 
the unaffordability of resulting vaccines (4). 
Such concerns underlie the Nagoya Protocol 
(NP) to the Convention on Biological Diver-
sity (CBD), which stipulates that access to 
genetic resources must be preceded by con-
sent from providing countries and (bilateral) 
agreements on access and benefit-sharing 
(ABS). Users are responsible for tracing 
rights holders to negotiate and obtain certifi-
cates and permits for any sample (5). Partial 
implementation, lack of transparency in na-
tional legislations, and divergent interpreta-
tions of rights and obligations under the NP 
can delay this process (6) and thus, for exam-
ple, obstruct the validation of diagnostics (7). 
The NP’s central information system, the ABS 
Clearing-House, lacks a complete picture of 
national ABS conditions (5). Moreover, the 
commercial nature and prospects of R&D are 
hard to determine ex ante, complicating ABS 
negotiations. Reliable mechanisms for track-
ing resources and access to those resources 
across storage systems are lacking (8) but 
called for to (temporarily) suspend negotia-
tions, rapidly share, and allow for formaliz-
ing intent retrospectively. If the NP’s scope is 
expanded to include genetic sequence data 
(GSD)—as currently debated—free sharing 
and rapid exchanges of data risk additional 
obstruction (2, 5).
Secrecy and fragmented R&D
Timely sharing of data and information on 
emerging pathogens can be frustrated by in-
dividual (competitive) interests, reinforced 
by systemic incentives (2, 6). Researchers 
have an incentive to publish peer-reviewed 
papers and demonstrate scientific priority (2, 
9). Preprint platforms and close interactions 
between publishers and the PH community 
accelerate dissemination timelines but can 
still delay sharing until raw data or materials 
have been analyzed and processed unilater-
ally into publishable formats. Governments 
and researchers lack trust in reciprocity for 
shared resources and especially for GSD, be-
cause reliable mechanisms to track access 
and use across (public and private) systems 
remain absent (8). Even in the presence of 
designated portals hosted by PH authorities, 
lack of trust in database security and confi-
dentiality can keep researchers from sharing 
(6). Closed data hubs developed for fast shar-
ing offer limited means for managing and 
monitoring access of individual resources 
on a case-by-case basis (9). For severe acute 
respiratory syndrome–coronavirus 2 (SARS-
CoV-2) sequences, a closed hub was created 
under the Global Initiative on Sharing All 
Influenza Data (GISAID) that controls access 
and prohibits redistribution. Commercial 
aspirations can also cause sharing delays, as 
patent incentives impede open dissemina-
tion before patent applications are drafted 
and submitted (6). Reluctance in sharing is 
further explained by data sensitivity. Coun-
tries may fear impaired trade and tourism, 
and criticism on the appropriateness of 
measures taken (6). Source tracing or data 
triangulation can unintentionally lead to the 
identification of affected regions or individu-
als (2, 10). Furthermore, actors risk infring-
ing on ethical and legal frameworks (e.g., the 
European Union’s General Data Protection 
Regulation), especially once outbreak emer-
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Competition between labs can lead to frag-
mentation of intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) over GSD-based inventions and to 
time-consuming legal procedures to deter-
mine who has priority for each claim (3). 
Uncertain ownership rights translate into 
uncertain accessibility and affordability of 
building-block resources, subsequently delay-
ing investments by downstream developers 
(3). For Middle East respiratory syndrome–
coronavirus (MERS-CoV), conflicts over own-
ership delayed sharing, leading to persistent 
knowledge gaps on viral origins and trans-
mission dynamics and hampering the devel-
opment of vaccines and treatments (11). Yet, 
IPRs remain an important incentive for nec-
essary industry investment in high-risk R&D 
to develop and produce diagnostics, vaccines, 
and therapeutics (3).
BLOCKCHAIN TO OVERCOME BARRIERS
Blockchain could help address root causes by 
underpinning the outbreak R&D ecosystem 
as a common, privacy-preserving, inviolable, 
and verifiable layer for records of objects 
and identities (e.g., resources, individuals, 
and organizations), rules (e.g., access permis-
sions and ABS provisions), and events (e.g., 
access and benefit-sharing). Some have ex-
pressed concern about the cost and sustain-
ability of implementing blockchain systems, 
but advanced models have appeared that 
do not rely on energy-guzzling algorithms 
to operate the distributed ledger and assure 
the integrity of its records. For instance, the 
necessary software and servers to imple-
ment a blockchain network can be hosted by 
a consortium of known, reputable, and pre-
appointed authority node operators (ANOs), 
and network access can be restricted to per-
mitted entities (i.e., those registered in the 
system and holding the right permissions). 
Such a federated, permissioned network 
model offers superior scalability, sustainabil-
ity, and options for confidentiality as com-
pared to “permissionless” systems such as 
the Bitcoin or public Ethereum blockchains. 
Current open-source technologies exist that 
allow for integration with traditional data-
base management systems and appear fit 
for cost-effective and compatible prototyp-
ing and implementation of an outbreak R&D 
blockchain infrastructure (ORBI). We dis-
cuss key concepts and features of a possible 
ORBI [elaborated on in the supplementary 
materials (SM)]. 
Trustful sharing
An ORBI would enable actors to anchor 
hashed records of their digital or physical 
resources to establish time-stamped proof of 
their existence, integrity, and (scientific) pri-
ority in the blockchain. Records themselves 
would be kept in an “off-chain” repository (9) 
and include indexing metadata (i.e., fields 
that systematically describe the resource, for 
example, pathogenic properties, provenance, 
and ownership) to enable querying and anal-
ysis by permitted entities only. Records would 
also include hashes of and pointers to the un-
derlying resources themselves, which could 
be stored in any existing storage service. De-
pending on the preferences of resource pro-
viders (e.g., desired level of confidentiality), 
these may be open-access repositories [e.g., 
of the International Nucleotide Sequence Da-
tabase Collaboration (INSDC)] or restricted 
systems (e.g., private encrypted data vaults or 
semi-open platforms like GISAID).
Data privacy and sensitivity concerns 
would be addressed through decentralized 
identity and access management: Only enti-
ties that can cryptographically authenticate 
with a decentralized identifier (DID) that 
meets the right conditions are granted per-
mission to discover and/or access records 
and underlying resources. DIDs are globally 
unique identifiers that are registered on the 
blockchain for all network entities (e.g., indi-
viduals, organizations, devices, resources, or 
any other digital or physical objects). DIDs 
contain no personally identifiable informa-
tion, can point to external locations (e.g., 
storage services or other service end points), 
and enable universal authentication of iden-
tities and their attributes (e.g., qualifications, 
permissions, or other credentials). Required 
credentials or other access conditions can 
be controlled by resource providers to meet 
(confidentiality) requirements of any ap-
plicable ethical or legal (IPR) framework. 
Conditions would be deployed through smart 
contracts: blockchain-registered scripts that 
can trigger an action (e.g., grant access) on 
recording conditionally relevant events (e.g., 
authenticating with the required credentials) 
(9, 12). These mechanisms could incentivize 
actors to rapidly time-stamp records—espe-
cially when contributions by data collectors 
and repositories would become adopted into 
the norms for scientific attribution or claim-
ing ownership of inventions. Next to records 
of samples and sequences, researchers could 
register analyzed data before writing and 
publishing (preprint) papers. PH centers 
could register raw epidemiological datasets 
before analyzing and processing into ag-
gregated country-level reports, enabling in-
tegrated analyses by authorized entities or 
analysis support when centers are heavily 
burdened during a PH crisis. The mecha-
nisms would offer actors fine-grained control 
over exposure, for example, enabling instant 
selective disclosure of sensitive data to supra-
national coordinating bodies only, offering a 
head start while countries prepare their of-
ficial public response and measures.
As suggested by MiPasa, a recent multi-
stakeholder initiative for coronavirus disease 
2019 (COVID-19) surveillance, blockchain-fa-
cilitated sharing can feed into improved and 
accelerated analyses of PH data, a use case 
for which blockchain has also been consid-
ered by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention in the United States on a national 
level. This use case can be extended to en-
hance resource sharing and collaboration 
among public, private, and academic actors 
throughout the outbreak R&D chain. 
Traceability, interoperability, defragmentation 
DIDs offer decentralized control over identity 
attributes and service end points, comple-
menting and integrating key (centralized) 
tools for resource traceability—notably the 
INSDC’s accession number for sequences, 
digital object identifiers for publications, and 
the internationally recognized certificate of 
compliance (IRCC) for NP access permits. 
Existing identifiers could be attributed to a 
DID hosted in the common ORBI to establish 
stable links, addressing fragmentation and 
redundancy issues of the current system (8) 
and reducing administrative burden.
Paired with a time-stamped audit log, 
DIDs and smart contract–coordinated per-
missions would enable a reliable tracking 
system for both resources and access events 
across storage systems (8). Access interfaces 
can be offered for existing database man-
agement systems and their users who want 
to verify identities and permissions on the 
blockchain (12), allowing data to be stored 
as before but increasing monitoring options. 
Access events would be recorded to shape an 
immutable audit trail (i.e., who accesses what 
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and under which conditions). Such a shared 
identity and access management system en-
ables secure interconnections between stor-
age systems that are currently siloed or only 
integrated at national or regional levels (2, 
8). Although unintended circulations outside 
the tracking system (e.g., offline) are hard to 
rule out completely, blockchain mechanisms 
offer to strengthen the chain of custody tool 
kit of existing systems. They offer verifiable 
records (e.g., all parties with unique access 
keys) should disputes arise and be resolved 
under any existing legal framework, reduc-
ing reluctance to share and bringing data 
resources within the scope of NP principles 
of fair ABS (8). Foul play would be further 
discouraged when disclosing audit trails 
becomes expected in GSD-based publishing 
and patenting.
Facilitating compliance
Smart contracts would be applied to automate 
identification and authorization processes, 
accelerating, easing, and reducing transac-
tion costs of compliance procedures. For in-
stance, contracts could generate (and record) 
a unique access key for network entities on 
signing for the required ABS provisions, or 
trigger ABS obligations (e.g., payment) on re-
cording actual access. This would enable us-
ers to demonstrate and assert compliance for 
both public and protected resources without 
the current administrative burden, substan-
tially reducing sharing timelines. Blockchain 
prohibits unilateral changes to deployed 
smart contracts, clarifying and enforcing per-
missions, rights, and obligations for network 
entities. With the DIDs and audit log, the sys-
tem could rebuild trust in agreements being 
upheld, incentivizing the input of resources.
Though smart contracts would allow 
for bilateral terms and conditions, a lack of 
alignment and harmonization in ABS pro-
visions would impede the efficiency of an 
ORBI. Progress by governments and PH au-
thorities on defining the scope, alignment, 
and harmonization of governance structures, 
and especially legal global frameworks, thus 
remains crucial (1, 5). An ORBI offers to fa-
cilitate policy implementation and promote 
compliance by translating best practices—
such as the standardized material transfer 
agreements for research and commercial 
use under the World Health Organization’s 
(WHO’s) Pandemic Influenza Preparedness 
(PIP) Framework—into a certified library of 
smart contract templates, along with user 
interface components to modify the values 
of prespecified template attributes. In the 
Indonesian H5N1 case, such a system could 
have assisted in granting prompt access for 
entities involved in a noncommercial re-
sponse while triggering conditional ABS pro-
visions for any commercial follow-up.
Mapping R&D contributors 
Blockchain could further contribute to trust 
and reciprocity by mapping contributors and 
their agreements throughout the outbreak 
R&D chain, avoiding time-consuming proce-
dures for clarifying ownership such as those 
that were needed during the MERS-CoV 
emergency (11). R&D records could be stored 
in a repository that is optimized for directed 
acyclic graphs, which allows related records 
to be linked, capturing the evolution of R&D 
branches over time. A similar mechanism 
is applied by GitHub and finds support in 
recent literature (13). The audit log would 
affirm appropriate links and rightful con-
tributions, and foul play could be further 
discouraged by algorithmically identifying 
probable links based on record metadata 
(probabilistic graphical modeling). Graphs 
may even assist in consolidating IPRs over 
ensuing inventions when smart contracts 
that define how to equitably distribute own-
ership among contributors are properly de-
signed, certified, and offered in the system 
as configurable templates. These could coor-
dinate auditable distribution of arising ben-
efits (e.g., royalties) to all contributors—from 
those who register samples to those commit-
ting evidence of scientific value and/or pat-
entability, and all stakeholders in between. 
In response to SARS, aggregating all fair con-
tributors into a single patent-holding consor-
tium (a patent pool) could have reduced risks 
for licensees and accelerated follow-on R&D 
(3). R&D graphs could thus support com-
plex multistakeholder networks such as the 
WHO’s R&D Blueprint and the Coalition for 
Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) 
in prioritizing R&D while respecting indi-
vidual ownership, by recording public and 
private contributions that can be accounted 
for retrospectively.
THOUGHTS ON IMPLEMENTATION
Key concepts we have discussed have been 
explored in recent efforts (9, 12, 13) and fit 
with existing open-source technologies (see 
SM). However, designing and implementing 
an ORBI-like system raises sociopolitical, le-
gal, and technical issues that need effective 
resolution. Political willingness and involve-
ment of stakeholders at the global gover-
nance level (e.g., WHO, Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, World 
Organisation for Animal Health, World In-
tellectual Property Organization, and CBD) 
will be essential for aligning with existing 
(legal) frameworks and procedures and for 
coordinating pilots demonstrating system 
functioning in (simulated) practice. Adopting 
a multistakeholder governance model analo-
gous to the Global Health Security Agenda, 
embodied by a dedicated steering group 
(SG) that includes a fair, global representa-
tion of acknowledged stakeholders, seems 
promising (see SM). An SG could oversee 
the appointment of ANOs and facilitate in-
system design, implementation, and promo-
tion through technical and policy working 
groups. Standardization of key enabling tech-
nologies (e.g., through the International Or-
ganization for Standardization, World Wide 
Web Consortium, and Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers) and interfaces 
with existing storage systems (e.g., INSDC, 
GISAID, and COMPARE) will determine suc-
cess and sustainability, as will intuitive user 
clients and graphical user interfaces (2). 
Increased restrictions on sharing through 
strengthened access control could emerge 
but seem unlikely because this may conflict 
with legal obligations under the Interna-
tional Health Regulations and principles of 
cooperation, transparency, and openness. Fi-
nally, blockchain is not a panacea. Efforts to 
address market failures and regional capac-
ity building to improve R&D are essential for 
long-term preparedness (14, 15). j
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